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2. More precisely, the situation discussed was defined by seven attributes involved in mass contracting, of which the last was: "The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a whole is the payment of money." Id. at 1177. [Vol. 104:1235 other customers who present complaints that are overblown or unjustifi ed.
Since this may be to the benefit of most consumers, the existence of these one-sided contracts does not show that consumers do not understand what they are agreeing to. In such circumstances, Bebchuk and Posner say, the "courts would do well to take a hard line in enforcing the terms of one-sided consumer contracts in the absence of evidence of fraud."
4 For if this is done, then in the shadow of the law where most cases will be decided, the one sided terms of the form contracts will be counterbalanced by the other-sided nature of the market in reputation, in which sellers worry about their good name much more than consumers do theirs. Apparently, this approach is to apply without regard to how harsh the content of the form terms is, because the primary function of the form terms is to give firms the room they want in which to maneuver.
Without belaboring the issue, Bebchuk and Posner seem to me to do nothing to show that this combination of judicial enforcement and the repu tational concerns of firms will produce systematically desirable results.
There is no reason to think it will in any way lead firms to recognize volun tarily the supposed legitimate claims of decent consumers at a volume or a value that is congruent with, or even regularly near to, any known measure of a proper number-resembling, that is, either any known legal measure of harm or any known economic measure of an incentive for efficient behavior. The articles presented at this symposium are remarkable for the intelli gence with which they approach the problem of boilerplate, for the amount of work they represent (especially those based on empirical investigation),
and for the variety of approaches taken and subjects addressed. It is too much to hope to find a unified conclusion that all the papers would support.
But I do think there is a single thread that appears in the fabric of many of the papers that is worth teasing out. It is, as I have already suggested, a methodological thread, and the essence of it can be stated simply: in order to understand boilerplate and to determine the law's proper response to it, one must approach it by building a structural model of how it is produced and used that goes beyond the model assumed both in ordinary contract law and in much of the economic analysis of law as well. Or, more simply, what the articles reveal is the need for a sophisticated and differentiated law and so ciology of boilerplate.
It is not a new idea that legal rules can only be evaluated when viewed as constituent parts of a working social system. Indeed, built into the stan dard doctrinal treatment of ordinary (that is, non-boilerplate) contracts, one
can already see an implicit institutional dynamic. We should support the regime of contracts, we are told, because the practice of making, relying on, performing, and enforcing contracts enhances welfare and enlarges freedom.
While these asserted connections between contract and welfare and freedom are often treated as if they were in some sense "natural," they in fact rest on two structural constructs. They rest on an assumed form of the direct rela tionship between the parties, and on an assumed market in which the parties' relationship is embedded.
Viewed as a dyadic interaction, contracts are assumed to be the product of bargaining and mutual assent. and additional features is a blurry one. But it seems to me that the older arti cles that discussed boilerplate in terms of markets dominated by monopolies or oligopolies, 9 and the recent articles that expanded the "rational actor"
with ideas of "bounded rationality," "satisficing" instead of maximizing, and the numerous heuristic mistakes ordinary people make, to fall within the "standard model, more subtlety" group. So do some of the articles at this symposium. But many of the articles here collected do something different.
Looking at the facts regarding how, in particular contexts, boilerplate is propromise, with no further showing of the justice of enforcement required. By contrast, if enforcement is sought on the grounds that the promise was relied on or that it was given in recognition of a pre viously received benefit, the justice of enforcement must be independently shown. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § § 71, 79, 86, 90 (1981) .
7.
Thus, in the paradigmatic case of a transaction that was overturned purely and simply because of the impact of general circumstances not caused in any respect by the other party, who merely took advantage of them, the Court said:
The contrivance of an auction sale, under such circumstances, where the master of [the stranded ship] was hopeless, helpless, and passive-where there was no market, no money, no competition-where one party had absolute power, and the other no choice but submission where the vendor must take what is offered or get nothing-is a transaction which has no char acteristic of a valid contract.
Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150, 159 (1856) (auctioning off for very little money the cargo of a whaling ship stranded in the Bering Straits with winter coming on and few other ships around). The contrary view, that even in a competitive marketplace, transactions can be coercive-for instance, for the poor or for the unskilled worker-is surely not frivolous. Indeed, this point of view is repre sented in some statutory law-for instance, in statutes establishing minimum wages--even though it is surely not adopted by the common law of contracts.
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9. E.g., Kessler's article, id. at 632 . duced and used, their authors have found that the gap between the assumed general model underlying contract law and the phenomena to be addressed is so great as to be unbridgeable simply by positing deviations from perfect contractors or perfect markets. Instead, they have had to take note of and build models based on additional institutional and cultural structures. In do ing so, while I do not say that they will adopt the term, they seem to me to have crossed into terrain best labeled "law and sociology."
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E.g., Robert
The models developed in these various essays are by no means the same, either in the social phenomena highlighted or in the legal conclusions pro posed. Whether the differences among these various models reflect the variety of observed social life or simply the many eyes of different behold ers seems to me a topic for another day after more work has been done. For the present, what seems to me more important is to look at the range of is sues that these essays suggest ought to be addressed. As I count them, there are four sorts of considerations that go into the making of the more complex types of model these authors use. Gulati investigate relates specifically to sovereign issuers of debt using lan guage that has in view non-sovereign issuers.
13 The alternatives that Kevin
Davis discusses relate specifically to nonprofit drafters of form contracts. 14 Or, to use other words, implicit in the analysis of many of the papers is the 
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See, e.g., their discussion of the degree to which tier-I companies can successfully hold up the Original Equipment Manufacturers for additional benefits after the contracts have been signed. Id. at 974-76.
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Stephen claim that, in order to determine the law rightly, we need to consider the particular institutional location of the parties involved.
Second, to understand many of the dynamics of the use of boilerplate, it seems we need to consider the broad network of relationships that these in stitutionally located entities have. The law of contracts usually focuses, and focuses rather narrowly, on the direct relationship of the entities that are making a deal (who are typically, in the litigation context, the juridically defined parties). When we build models of what is actually going on regard ing boilerplate, however, we find that what those who make deals do, is greatly influenced by what others are doing--0thers with whom they are not making deals but with whom they are linked in systematic relationships.
Of course, a dynamic of this sort was to some degree implicit in the tra ditional view that parties were greatly affected by the market. This approach remains important for considering the uses of boilerplate, too. We find, for example, that boilerplate used to define the obligations undertaken in some instruments is standardized because standardization facilitates creation of a market for these cofitractual instruments, which are meant to be publicly traded.
15 But many of the essays in this collection consider other, rather par ticular, institutional contexts that structurally link drafters or users of boilerplate. Thus, we find that the boilerplate used by any one insurance company will tend to be the same as that used by another in good part be cause that standardization enables actuarial data to be collected and shared across a much larger set of language-defined "events." 16 Meanwhile, in yet other industries, such as construction or real estate-in which contractual instruments are neither put on the market nor subject to an actuarial risk analysis-contractual terms are often standardized for the yet different rea son that they are drafted by one or a few trade associations. 17 Yet elsewhere, perhaps because none of these dynamics is in play, the terms used by any one firm may be standardized for its customers but quite different from the terms insisted on by its competitors. 18
Third, the implication of several of these essays is that the category "boilerplate" has itself taken on a cultural meaning, and that that fact is of practical significance. A set of contractual words represented to be, and ac cepted as, boilerplate-accompanied by the meaning (articulated or implied) that "this is boilerplate" or "these are standard terms" or "we al ways use terms like these" or "everyone uses terms like these"-is different in important ways from the same set of words absent those assertions.
Indeed, there are at least three sorts of differences. First, lawyers in a position unilaterally to draft contracts treat boilerplate differently. Indeed, we have the suggestion that even when premier law firms draft instruments running to billions of dollars, it may be true that "no one will have an incen tive to figure out the true meaning of such terms. clearly it defines an actuarial risk rather than by how likely it is to be con strued in the company's favor in a particular lawsuit. Construing it against the drafting party, but construing it clearly, thus makes redrafting less, not more, likely. 27
To summarize, if we are to build an adequate descriptive model of how boilerplate is produced and used and of the effect of legal rules on the proc ess, we need to consider: the types of parties involved in the transaction, indeed, as applied to boilerplate it might even be thought of as the comer solution that abstracts most completely from the phenomena to be observed.
As I have already said, the papers here presented do not come together to suggest a single alternative. Instead, the overall conclusion to be drawn from the work of this symposium is that we need to construct many--or at least several-structural models if we are rightly to understand and respond to the phenomena at issue.
Turning now to the prescriptive part of the matter, contract law, as al ready discussed, has traditionally been justified by connecting its rules, through its relatively simple view of personal dealings and market interac- as regards the legal system as a whole. They are always subject to revision by legislation or by properly authorized administrative action. Of course, there will be some stickiness in getting these other institutions to act, and that may mean that only if the judges produce a really bad result will they be corrected. But as has already been said, the same stickiness means, if the judges are not supposed to act, that only if the drafters of boilerplate pro duce a really bad result will they be corrected. It is a question of who in the system is allowed to take the initiative. If we think on balance that judges will improve outcomes by trying to build models like those suggested by the It seems to me, therefore, that there is still a considerable role, practical and intellectual, for judicial action. The alternative, it seems, is for the courts to go on treating boilerplate and standard forms as if they were ordi nary clauses in ordinary contracts. In many cases, in light of all that has been said at this symposium, that will produce the wrong result; and even in the cases in which it produces the right result, that right result will be ra tionalized on traditional grounds and therefore, intellectually speaking, accidental. The legal system as a whole certainly can do better, and in my view, the judges can, too.
The recognition that boilerplate has an institutional context-that how it is written and used, why it is written and used, and by whom it is written and used make a difference-is both true and important. That it makes life more complicated for those who study, teach, and write about contract law only proves its worth. That it also makes life more complicated for the exist ing institutions of the law cannot be denied, but it does not make sense to respond by pretending that what is true is not so. Rather, we have to think about the best way to pursue enough complexity to capture what is true while at the same time generating law that is clear enough for practical so cial purposes.
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